How dismal it is to see present day Americans yearning for the very orthodoxy that their country was founded to escape.
—Christopher Hitchens
Ranged against naturalism and dealing in illusion and delusion, fantasy and nonsense, are the priests and mullahs, rabbis and ministers, who are burdened with ancient mythologies. They seek to intrude, cajole, persuade, convert others to their archaic world-views, and have no qualms about doing so … The new frontier for naturalism is applying normative ethics to better enable us to lead more reasonable and satisfying lives on the scale of individuals, communities, and the planetary civilization that has emerged.
—Professor Paul Kurtz1
But the reality of the world today is that grounding ethics in religion is no longer adequate. This is why I believe the time has come to find a way of thinking about spirituality and ethics that is beyond religion.
—The Dalai Lama2
Faith in the possibilities of continued and rigorous inquiry does not limit access to truth to any channel or scheme of things. It does not first say that truth is universal and then add there is but one road to it.
—Philosopher John Dewey3
After conducting research on Scandinavian religious beliefs for more than a year, sociologist Phil Zuckerman came to a remarkable conclusion. The Danes and Swedes he had been painstakingly interviewing over the months weren’t reluctant to talk about religion, he decided—they were just profoundly uninterested in religion. What was remarkable about his finding was that, contrary to the expectations of ordinary Americans, this strong streak of irreligion was part of a society of perfectly normal and happy people. In Zuckerman’s words, it was “a markedly irreligious society—that was, above all, moral, stable, humane and deeply good.4
Zuckerman’s findings are interesting to compare with other studies which show that religiosity declines as individual prosperity increases. In country after country the same pattern emerges. Members of the poorest groups of a society are on average 17% more religious than members of the richest groups.5 The countries with the highest populations of convinced atheists are all developed nations—Japan, France, South Korea, Germany, the Netherlands, Austria—while the sole outlier, China, is home to one of the largest and fastest-growing economies in the world. By contrast, the most religious countries include third world nations such as Ghana, Nigeria, and Kenya and desperately poor former Soviet Bloc states such as Armenia, Romania, and Macedonia.6 Such studies show that religiosity correlates much more strongly with poverty than it does with morality.
Today, the greatest number of religious believers is found in the Middle East, Africa, and South America, while the greatest number of atheists is in Asia and Europe. The most compelling theory to date for this marked disparity is that religiosity declines as society becomes more secure in providing the necessities of life—food, health care, and housing in particular. Where food and shelter are scarce and human life is beset by insecurity, religious belief remains strong. In short, it is “levels of societal and individual security in any society [which] seem to provide the most persuasive and parsimonious explanation” for the global distribution of religious belief.7
If this theory is correct, American concerns about creeping immorality attending a drop in religious belief are completely misplaced. We should not be alarmed about rising unbelief, but rather we should regard that rise as quite natural as relative levels of wealth and security increase around the world. In the era of a global economy, where religion (in the form of Islam) presents a considerable threat rather than a bonus, the need is more pressing than ever for an ethical system based on natural reason rather than on metaphysics. We are in need of a universal secular ethics.
THE LIMITATIONS OF METAPHYSICAL ETHICS
Many people still think of ethical or moral ideas as bound to religion or metaphysics in some way. Nothing could be further from the truth, since morality is easily capable of existing completely independent of religion. The belief that religion is necessary for morality involves two critical errors. One error is the assumption, particularly common in cultures shaped by Semitic theology, that moral principles must be given or revealed to us by a divine being. The other error arises from mere ignorance of the fact that the most moral and beneficial actions today arise as a result not of religion but of secular science.
It is simply a mistake to say that moral principles must be given by God in order to be valid and binding. With metaphysical ethical systems, particularly Judaism and Islam, many of the principles or rules do not concern behavior which anyone ordinary thinks of as moral. For example, who other than a religious believer regards it is a moral issue whether or not to eat pork or to wipe your bottom with the left hand rather than the right? Such rules are not universal; they are only used to set one group apart from another. Indeed, both the Judaic and the Islamic ethical systems are dualistic, mandating one set of rules for believers to follow with other believers and another set of rules for believers to follow with everyone else (i.e., with gentiles or kafirs).
Particularly in the case of Islam, the set of rules for dealing with kafirs is almost the furthest thing from genuine morality as possible. As this book has shown repeatedly, the Islamic system permits murder, rape, destruction, theft, and all manner of abuse to be used with kafirs. It even demands its followers regard themselves as in a perpetual state of war with kafirs. How can it be called moral or ethical for actions which are clearly unethical in one context (Muslims dealing with Muslims) to be completely acceptable in another (Muslims dealing with non-Muslims)?
Furthermore, when it comes to moral rules or principles provided by religion which are genuinely universal, there is no need for divine revelation at all. The value of moral principles such as “do not murder” or “do not covet your neighbor’s wife” can be discovered by anyone solely by the use of his own reason. We do not need God to tell us not to murder people or to desire things which belong to other people. Metaphysical ethics seem to be either useless (making commands about behavior which has nothing to do with morality), immoral (as with Islam’s dualistic ethics), or unnecessary (because reason can reach the same principles on its own).
Next, if one compares the benefits provided by metaphysical systems with those provided by science, it is easy to see greater advantages being provided by the latter. Take the example of edX, a massive online course platform established by Harvard and MIT in 2012 and provided free of charge for users in the U.S. and around the world. Courses cover computer science, electronics, public health, and more. More than 250,000 Indians took courses through edX, gaining knowledge and earning certificates to boost their job- seeking.8 How much more advantage did Indian people gain from these free courses than from the free lentils and rice provided by Mother Teresa and the Sisters of Charity?
The American biologist and humanitarian Normal Borlaug fed more poor and hungry people than even a million Mother Teresas. Borlaug’s development of high-yield wheat produced an enormous worldwide increase in the food supply in the 1960s, eventually earning him a Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts. Thanks to his scientific efforts, hundreds of millions—perhaps as many as one billion, by some estimates—of human lives were saved from starvation. These lives were not saved by metaphysical declarations but by the investigation and application of scientific principles.
Such examples could easily be multiplied. How many lives have been saved or improved by the discovery of vaccination in the early 19th century, anesthesia in the 1840s, or penicillin and insulin in the 1920s? What benefits have come to humanity from the discovery of calculus in the 17th century, the development of chemistry in the 18th century, atomic theory in the 19th century, or quantum mechanics in the 20th? Which has had a more salutary benefit on humanity, the products of science or the ethics of Islam? There is no comparison.
In cases like the missing Malaysia Airlines Flight 370, science and technology even contribute to our universal morality. Because of technology, many countries were able to cooperate with Malaysia in the search for its missing passenger jet. Because of internet and television coverage, the passengers were seen as human beings—members of our extended family. The interrelationships revealed by the coverage are turning the world into a global village, all thanks to the scientific progress of humanity. We see the same thing whether it’s coverage of a global story like the Winter Olympics which people share through YouTube and Google links and stories, or whether it’s people using Facebook, Twitter, and similar social media to raise awareness of atrocities such as the Rwanda Genocide. In all such cases it is secularism, science, technology, and human decency which are uniting people. Advancements in these areas have little or nothing to do with religion or metaphysics.
BEYOND METAPHYSICS: TOWARDS A SECULAR ETHICS
The common belief that metaphysics is necessary for moral behavior was famously expressed by the Russian novelist Fyodor Dostoevsky in Brothers Karamazov. Ivan, the tortured intellectual of the three brothers, suggests that “without God, all is permitted.” Ivan’s formula still echoes through philosophical and theological discourse today, where many feel there would be no basis for morality without religious belief. The feeling seems to be that science and reason alone cannot produce an effective morality. Although I agree with Dostoevsky, I agree in a very different sense than the usual one. Without God all is permitted only because we have not yet learned to live ethically without a religious or transcendental morality. This does not mean that no alternative is possible, but only that we have yet to develop one. A naturalistic ethics with no basis on metaphysics or religion, one which proceeds from the idea that valid moral principles can be derived only from facts about empirical reality, would be a promising alternative.
Developing such a naturalistic ethics is by no means an arbitrary or fruitless exercise. It stems from the acknowledgement that religion has been the root of considerable suffering throughout human history. Metaphysics is not the sole cause of such suffering, but it contributes significantly to the conditions which make unnecessary wars and unwarranted suffering possible and even likely. The conflict in the Middle East, which is ideologically and religiously driven, is a case in point. The religious morality there actually serves to justify the conflict and ensures that no reasonable end to it can be found.
Islam in particular endeavors to establish a global caliphate through imperialistic campaigns and justifies this endeavor by reference to the Qur’an and the doctrine of Jihad. In response, many Christian groups suggest that Islamic imperialism be countered with what amounts to a Christian alternative. But metaphysics cannot be answered with metaphysics; such an approach only ensures an endless conflict, as the continuing struggle between Israelis and Palestinians makes clear. The real conflict is between that which threatens human wellbeing (i.e., literal Islam) and that which preserves it. We need to eliminate the monopoly religion claims on morality, and remove the assumption that religion is exempt from ethical criticism. Instead, we must look to the natural world—to objective, observable reality—for ethical wisdom. Such an approach to morality is known as ethical naturalism.
ETHICAL NATURALISM AND THE FAILURE OF OTHER ETHICAL SYSTEMS
Ethical naturalism has an unfairly tainted reputation. Some assume that it is merely a doctrine which suggests that “natural” actions are right and “unnatural” actions are wrong. Although this assumption is common, it is mistaken. Instead, “naturalism” should be understood in the same way as it is in the natural science—as referring to empirical epistemology which says, in essence, that all facts are facts about the natural world. Ethical naturalists begin from this idea because without basing our ethical ideas on scientific knowledge we have no way of justifying that any particular ethical claim is better than another.
Ethical naturalists have cast off many of the ideas which have weighted down philosophy for centuries. It is not necessary, from their perspective, to uncover absolute moral truth or certainty, or to arrive at an understanding of what is “good” in itself. Such ideas as free will, “the good,” and moral truth are in large part instances where philosophy has overstepped its boundaries and created unnecessary difficulties. Many of the criticisms of ethical naturalism proceed from misplaced assumptions and false problems which ethical naturalists do not actually need to solve. Although there are some valid criticisms, by no means has ethical naturalism truly been refuted.
One misplaced assumption made by many philosophers holds that the only alternative to metaphysical ethics is nihilism. Nihilism is the belief that there are no moral truths and that any moral claims are essentially fictitious. From a nihilist perspective, there is no justifiable grounds on which any moral claim can be justified or attacked. Nihilism is the reason why many, including some non-religious people, go along with the idea that “without God, all is permitted.” They believe that outside of a metaphysical foundation there is no proper basis for ethical beliefs. But this concern is unwarranted: a system of ethics which is not based in metaphysical claims is indeed possible.
Another problem which ethical naturalism avoids is absolutism. Absolutism is the belief that there are moral truths which are absolutely true and that we can and sometimes—particularly in the revealed religions—that we do know them. The problem with this system is that it presumes that simple principles can account for every possible experience in human life and will produce the best possible outcome in any situation. Take the case of the principle “You shall not steal,” which is common to the three Semitic monotheistic faiths. It is assumed that this precept is the command of an omniscient God, that it is absolutely true, and that it must be followed unconditionally on pain of eternal suffering.
However, consider a scenario where a mother chooses to steal food from a wealthy man to feed her starving children. The wealthy man does not suffer markedly for losing so little. Most people would forgive the woman, or at least would not condemn her absolutely for her action. Yet religious doctrine teaches that if the woman steals she has sinned and will suffer damnation for it—and it holds that this punishment is absolutely better than no punishment at all. Although this scenario is only hypothetical, there is no question that real life offers any number of similar situations. It is clear that absolutist beliefs are inadequate to such situations. In fact, when absolutist beliefs are applied to such situations, it increases the likelihood that unjust punishments will occur. The case of petty thieves in the Middle East having their hands cut off comes to mind. Islamic extremists generally invoke ethical absolutism all the time in order to justify acts of violence and murder.
If absolutism is used to justify immorality, it is ethical relativism which often keeps us from contesting such justifications. Relativism comes in many forms, but it can be loosely defined as a doctrine which holds that ideas of right and wrong are not universally applicable but are only relatively valid. Some relativists hold that moral ideas are defined either by each individual or by a given culture and are true only relative to that individual or culture. Others argue that there are multiple equally valid conceptions of morality in the world. From a relativist standpoint, it is impossible to judge the actions of al-Qaeda or the Muslim Brotherhood as “wrong.” This position is particularly popular in the western media, which prefers to ignore the religious or Islamic dimensions to the conflict in the Middle East, and refuses to make moral judgments about the constant parade of violence it portrays there.
In a sense, it is understandable why so many subscribe to a relativist position. The ethical systems which are currently established and available to all are each in their own way insufficient. It makes choosing an ethical position akin to choosing the least rotten egg of the bunch. Skeptics in particular tend to seek shelter from the conflicting and varied absolutist theories in the fuzzy haze of relativism.
REASONS FOR NATURALIZING ETHICS
If we assume that the empirical view of the world is right—that there are no gods or transcendent realms—then ethics have always been a product of the human mind alone. The problem is, for most of our history, this product of the human mind has not acknowledged itself as such. The Ten Commandments, for example, which are thought to be the revealed will of an omniscient God, are actually an invention of the mind. The mind is fallible, of course, and so are many of its products. When haphazard inventions of the mind such as the moral precepts found in religious texts are believed to be absolute truths, the original problem becomes compounded. Therefore, the process of naturalizing ethics must involve, on the one hand, getting people to acknowledge that ethical principles are necessarily products of human reason and, on the other, getting rationalists to admit that human reason possesses no transcendent powers.
Since ethical precepts are necessarily products of the imperfect human mind, we should approach all ethical claims with considerable skepticism. Given how varied and dynamic human existence is, it is impossible to produce ethical principles which are absolutely true in every case and to every possible extent. As far back as Aristotle, the best moral philosophers have long suspected that certainty or precision in ethical matters is simply impossible:
[Moral] actions … admit of much variety and fluctuation of opinion … and good [things] also give rise to a similar fluctuation because they bring harm to many people; for before now men have been undone by reason of their wealth, and others by reason of their courage. We must be content, then, in speaking about such subjects and with such premises to indicate the truth roughly and in outline … for it is the mark of an educated man to look for precision in each class of things just so far as the nature of the subject admits.9Ethical propositions are essentially claims as to how human beings should behave in order to achieve the highest state of human wellbeing possible. As such, they necessarily contain some assumptions about what constitutes human wellbeing. It is in these assumptions that we find many of the key disagreements. Christians, for example, identify the highest state of human wellbeing with salvation and may even prioritize obtaining salvation over any other form of wellbeing (such as having the resources to live well). From the view of naturalistic ethics, this priority on salvation is misplaced—humans are physical beings and salvation is a metaphysical construct. Looked at in this way, the mission to “save souls” can even be detrimental to human wellbeing in some cases. After all, the virtues necessary for salvation include unconditional faith in revealed doctrines and in the existence of God. If such virtues interfere with human wellbeing, they can lead to disaster. As Aristotle might say, many men have been undone by their faith as well as by their wealth or their courage.
Naturalistic ethics can bring significant benefit when it comes to identifying human wellbeing. As Sam Harris points out in The Moral Landscape, wellbeing ultimately comes down to human experience—and therefore, to states of consciousness. Human consciousness cannot be explored or examined by logic alone, we must also employ the empirical investigations of neuroscience (rather than mere philosophy or theology). Our brains are subject to natural laws and empirical investigation, so it stands to reason that our consciousness, which is produced by our brains, is also subject to such laws and such investigations. Ethical discourse needs to take into account the findings of the sciences, especially neuroscience, if it is going to produce a working account of human wellbeing.
Also when we ask questions about human wellbeing we are asking questions about human nature. Thus far, ethics have too often been based on accounts of human nature produced by metaphysical philosophy and theology—that is, by definition they have been based upon inventions of the mind rather than observations of reality. Since the discovery of evolution by Wallace and Darwin, the former belief that human nature was given and unchanging has been transformed by the realization that human nature developed and changed over time into what we recognize today (and will possibly change further into the future). A naturalistic approach to human nature can take into account the discoveries of science and evolution—both what we have discovered so far and what we are continuing to discover as we investigate man more fully.
OBJECTIONS TO METAPHYSICAL ACCOUNTS OF HUMAN NATURE
Metaphysical and theological accounts of human nature are limited by unwarranted and false assumptions. One of the most persistent of these falsehoods is belief in the existence of mind/body dualism. This is the doctrine that human beings consist of a physical body and a non-physical, transcendental mind. According to this doctrine, the body and mind may be mutually independent, but the mind nevertheless has a hierarchical priority over the body. As persistent as this doctrine has been over the years, the empirical evidence does not support it. First, we have accumulated considerable evidence that all the qualities we associate with the mind are purely physical and completely explicable in purely physical terms. Second, there has never been a satisfactory explanation for how our supposed transcendental half is connected to our physical half. Third, as a fact of experience we can witness how purely physical injuries to the brain affect the workings of the human mind. If the mind were transcendental, how could it be that mere physical damage could affect it so dramatically?
Another common practice in metaphysical and theological systems is to formulate some idea of human nature that separates the individual human will from the world of natural causes. This is usually done by asserting the existence of a soul which exists apart from physical reality but can affect it through its control of the human body. This claim about the soul is subject to the same objections raised above with regard to mind/body dualism. In addition, the claim requires some sort of belief in a transcendental realm to act as a sort of “home” for the soul. The problem is that the existence of the soul or a transcendental realm—or even the absolute freedom of the will itself—cannot be proven empirically.
One of the most persistent examples of the above problem is the metaphysical idea of human original sin. This is the idea that all human beings are flawed because of the failure of our first parents (Adam and Eve) to live up to the moral code established by God. But the idea that all human beings can be blamed for the fault of our original ancestors is a logical absurdity. As Ayn Rand argues:
A sin without volition is a slap at morality and an insolent contradiction in terms: that which is outside the possibility of choice is outside the province of morality. If a man is evil by birth, he has no will, no power to change it; if he has no will, he can be neither good nor evil; a robot is amoral. To hold, as man’s sin, a fact not open to his choice is a mockery of morality.10
In other words, the metaphysical approach which sees all human beings as flawed due to no direct choice or fault of their own flies directly in the face of what morality is. We do not blame people for things which they had no choice about or which were not their fault. How can we believe that God would blame people for the same things?
Some philosophers, most notably the German Idealists, go so far as to claim that empirical inquiry itself is inherently flawed and that only “pure reason” can bring us to an understanding of reality. J.G. Fichte claimed that his philosophy, although it made empirical claims about human psychology, was exempt from empirical standards of justification:
My system can be evaluated only on its own terms and cannot be judged by the principles of any other philosophy. It only has to agree with itself. It can be explained only by itself, and it can be proven—or refuted—only on its own terms.11
Written in the late 18th century, Fichte’s request for a one-way relationship with empiricism wasn’t acknowledged as fallacious until the 20th century development of empirical philosophy.
While it is the role of philosophy to make the case that ethics should be derived from human nature, it is the role of the empirical sciences to discover and define that nature. We do not go to philosophers to distinguish between different animal species. We do not ask theologians to tell us the defining features of a dog or a tree. We accept in these cases that science tells us about the nature of animals and other living things. Man is in a sense just another animal or living thing. Science produces knowledge of such things, and philosophy works with this knowledge. When each discipline stays within its well define role, our investigations can make progress. Naturalistic ethics is based on the idea that our approach to ethics should proceed from the knowledge of human nature which science provides.
THE “OUGHT-IS” PROBLEM
One final objection to naturalistic ethics must be considered. This is the claim, supposedly derived from the philosopher David Hume, that one cannot derive an “ought” from an “is.” The objection here rests on the idea that factual claims (what “is” or “is not”) are essentially different from moral claims (what “ought” to be or not), and the latter cannot logically be deduced from the former. According to this objection, since “ought” cannot come from “is,” it’s impossible to have a naturalistic ethics (a system of ought’s) based on the findings of empirical science (the study of what is).12
As Flanagan, Sarkissian, and Wong point out, however, this criticism assumes that ethical naturalists are arguing that ethics is a science. This is not what the argument is. Ethical naturalists are not doing metaphysical philosophy, where it is common to construct propositions which purport to be valid claims about empirical reality based on nothing but mental chimeras. Ethical naturalists are not seeking to produce ethical certainty or rigorous deductive proof.
Instead, ethical naturalists are empiricists. They work with the empirical sciences and must have some understanding of the methods and discoveries employed by those sciences. They do not proceed by deductive reasoning from principles (the technique used by metaphysics since its principles come from assumptions about reality); they proceed by inductive reasoning based upon collections of data and observations of trends, tendencies, probabilities, patterns. When we argue that naturalistic ethics should replace metaphysical ethics we’re arguing that this methodology is superior. It’s better to collect and collate data about how people actually behave, how they think, what effects their actions have on themselves and others, and so forth than it is to make unwarranted assumptions about humanity and deduce hard and fast rules from these which can apply to any and all ethical situations.
In his book Ethics and Language, Charles L. Stevenson addresses this problem of deducing ethical precepts from factual statements. Stevenson points out that they type of validity we use in ethics is not the same that we use in formal logic. He argues that questions of “validity” which are raised by philosophers concerned by the “ought-is” problem are irrelevant. As he puts it, inferring from a set of reasons to an ethical conclusion will not be demonstratively valid—not because the inference is wrong but because the usual criteria of validity is incompatible. “When an inference does not purport to comply with the usual rules, any insistence on its failure to do so is gratuitous.”13 Complaints about the “naturalistic fallacy” or the ought-is problem are not warranted. Instead, they are false problems which ethical naturalists do not need to address.
In order to make the step from reasons to an ethical conclusion, all we need is a consideration of what constitutes human wellbeing. This will be done empirically, with reference to physical and mental conditions that can be measured and determined. It is important to realize that we will not be able to measure human wellbeing in a strict linear way. There is no straight line with the greatest possible suffering at one end and the best possible state at the other. Rather, when we take into account the dynamic nature of human existence we will find cases of suffering and wellbeing with varying intensities and even mixtures. It will be a three dimensional landscape, with many peaks of wellbeing and valleys of suffering. As we accumulate more knowledge, our understanding of what contributes to these peaks and valleys and how to negotiate them can only increase.
As a general rule, we propose no absolutist principles but instead promote conduct which promotes the lowest amount of suffering and the highest amount of wellbeing. In practice, this approach will involve more case-by-case sifting of facts rather than the establishment of rigid principles to be applied uniformly. This will be a longer and more difficult process, but the end result will be far better and more flexible than anything a metaphysical system of ethics could produce.
A SECULAR HUMANIST APPROACH TO ETHICAL THOUGHT
Professor and humanist Paul Kurtz has drafted a set of principles for ethical thinking which can serve as a model for what I mean by secular ethics. Kurtz’s principles are not absolutist commandments but principled and reasonable statements flexible enough to be adapted to a wide variety of human beliefs and situations. Rather than a list of rules revealed by God, the principles arise from observations of human life and contemporary concerns about how people can best behave with one another. For example, one of Kurtz’s principles is a commitment to an open, pluralistic, and democratic society as the best way of ensuring the protection of the human rights of all persons.14
Kurtz’s principles also strive for universal applicability—a quality which revealed religions notably lack. For instance: “We attempt to transcend divisive parochial loyalties based on race, religion, gender, nationality, creed, class, sexual orientation, or ethnicity, and strive for the common good of humanity.”15 Furthermore, he affirms commitment to what he calls “common moral decencies” such as altruism, honesty, and responsibility. A humanist ethics means that we reason together to find common cores of moral agreement rather than strive to impose our moral code upon others. A humanist ethics means that we learn to negotiate and compromise with others in order to transcend our individual differences. It is the complete opposite of any religion which seeks to impose its ideals by the sword.
Finally, Kurtz’s principles are committed to a foundation based on reason and science rather than on metaphysical beliefs. Therefore, he enunciates a belief in scientific discovery and new technology and opposition to efforts to seek answers to human problems outside of nature and human experience.16 To be committed to humanist ethics means to pursue answers through our own efforts and knowledge rather than from “trusting in a higher power.” To be committed to science is not an act of faith, but one based solidly on reason and experience. We do not trust in God or in the individual human agents of a God but in our collective wisdom. It is not a static system based on a singular revelation but a gradual and improving understanding of ourselves and the world. Kurtz’s principles show that it is possible to formulate principled ethical guidelines outside of references to God and religion. A fully developed secular ethics could easily proceed along the same course he began.
In conclusion, the endeavor to naturalize ethics is a necessary step in ending religious conflicts and contributing to world peace. The philosophical systems arranged against naturalistic ethics assume that it must conform to the methodologies they employ, but those methodologies are flawed. Since ethical certainty is impossible anyway, the inability of naturalistic ethics to produce absolutely true or certain ethical principles is no shortcoming. We must accept some amount of uncertainty in ethical matters, and we must be patient and meticulous enough to deal with problems on a case by case basis. In all things, the accumulated scientific knowledge of human nature will be our guide. Above all, we must learn to eliminate metaphysical language and assumptions from ethical discourse.