REASON IN REVOLT

The Hemlock and the Sword:

How Socrates’ calm death and Muhammad’s militant faith still divide the moral imagination of humanity.

Socrates was born around 470 BCE in Athens, in a democracy alive with debate and empire. His father was a stonemason, his mother a midwife, and he himself became a moral midwife for the Athenian mind. Athens was noisy with politics, tragedy, and war; Socrates walked barefoot through it all, asking questions no one wanted to answer. He fought bravely in the Peloponnesian War, lived modestly, and refused to take fees for his teaching. His method was interrogation, not revelation. He believed that truth emerged only through conversation and contradiction. He left no scripture, no army, no creed—only a way of thinking.

When accused of impiety and corrupting the youth, he defended himself not with rhetoric but with reason. He could have appealed to emotion; instead, he appealed to principle. When condemned, his friends arranged a secret escape. He refused. To run would betray the very laws he had lived under. So he drank the hemlock calmly, still talking of virtue as the poison rose in his veins. He died loyal to a city that had condemned him. The death of Socrates is the triumph of integrity over expedience, reason over fear, philosophy over the state.

Muhammad was born in Mecca around 570 CE, centuries later and hundreds of miles away, in a tribal world of oath and revenge. Orphaned early, he became a merchant known for reliability, married a wealthy widow, Khadijah, and lived quietly until, at forty, he began to speak of revelations from one God. His message of monotheism challenged Meccan elites whose economy depended on pagan pilgrimage. Facing hostility, he led his small following north to Medina. There, exile turned into statecraft. He became judge, lawgiver, and commander—a prophet wielding power.

Over the next decade, he consolidated a new community by persuasion and, when needed, by arms. The Qur’an, compiled after his death, speaks of mercy and forgiveness but also of struggle and justice. Early biographies describe battles—the defense of Medina, the conquest of Mecca—and the harshness that sometimes accompanied survival in seventh-century Arabia. To his followers, Muhammad was both messenger and model; to his opponents, he was a formidable rival who could forgive one day and punish the next.

Socrates’ Athens tolerated dissent until it became inconvenient; Muhammad’s Arabia tolerated pluralism until it became politically impossible. Where Socrates questioned the gods of his city, Muhammad abolished the gods of his tribe. The philosopher pursued wisdom without possession; the prophet claimed revelation with authority. Each stood against his world—but one by dialogue, the other by decree.

Muhammad’s household reflected both human affection and social strategy. After Khadijah’s death, he married several women, as was common among tribal leaders. Early Muslim historians record these marriages as acts of alliance and protection for widows. The most discussed is Aisha, daughter of Abu Bakr. Canonical hadith collections such as Sahih al-Bukhari report that she was betrothed to Muhammad while young and that the marriage was consummated when she had reached puberty; modern scholars debate how such ages were calculated and whether the report was literal or symbolic of youthful betrothal in that era. Another figure is Maria al-Qibtiyya, a woman of Coptic Egyptian origin who lived in Muhammad’s household and bore him a son, Ibrahim. Sources differ on her status—some call her wife, others concubine—but all describe Muhammad’s care for her and their child. These accounts reflect the norms and hierarchies of seventh-century Arabia, not the ethics of later centuries, yet they remain part of the historical record that modern readers must examine critically.

Violence marked the age and the mission alike. Early sources such as Ibn Ishaq and al-Tabari record episodes in which opponents were killed—acts that believers saw as war measures and critics see as suppression of dissent. The poet Kaʿb ibn al-Ashraf, accused of inciting attacks, was assassinated by loyal followers. The poetess Asma bint Marwan, who ridiculed Muhammad’s leadership, is reported in some later chronicles to have been slain by a supporter, though historians question the chain of transmission. The elderly Abu Afak, another satirist, was likewise killed according to disputed reports. The most solemn account concerns the Jewish tribe Banu Qurayza, accused of treachery during the siege of Medina. When they surrendered, their fate was judged by an allied arbitrator: the men executed, the women and children enslaved. Some scholars consider the numbers exaggerated or the judgment a reflection of tribal law rather than prophetic cruelty. Others view it as the birth of a state enforcing loyalty through exemplary punishment.

By contrast, Socrates killed no one and commanded no one to kill. He was accused of corrupting youth because he questioned the mythology of the polis, not because he overthrew it. His war was intellectual. The weapons were questions, and the casualties were pretensions. He undermined demagoguery without raising a sword. He believed that the unexamined life was unworthy, but he never claimed that the unexamined man was unworthy of life.

The two deaths encapsulate two moral worlds. Socrates accepts death to affirm a principle; Muhammad uses the threat of death to enforce a community’s survival. One sees law as a covenant of reason; the other sees law as the extension of divine will. The philosopher trusts dialogue to refine truth; the prophet trusts revelation to define it. Both inspire loyalty. Both leave followers who interpret their lives as models. But Socrates’ method invites questioners; Muhammad’s model demands believers.

To modern eyes, polygamy, slavery, and punitive warfare offend moral intuition, yet they were embedded in the social texture of late antiquity. Historians note that Muhammad mitigated some practices—limiting female infanticide, encouraging manumission, establishing rules of marriage—but did not abolish hierarchy. His revolution was religious and legal, not egalitarian in the modern sense. Socrates, living in a slave-owning Athens, also accepted social hierarchies, but his moral teaching was abstract: virtue is knowledge; injustice is ignorance. His focus was the inner life, not the reordering of society.

Both men changed the world in ways they could not foresee. Socrates inspired Plato, Aristotle, and a lineage of inquiry that became Western philosophy. Muhammad inspired Islamic civilization, law, art, and mysticism. Each became an archetype: Socrates, the martyr of reason; Muhammad, the prophet of revelation. One symbolizes doubt; the other certainty. One dies to preserve freedom of thought; the other builds a community of faith.

Yet the comparison also reminds us how fragile human morality is when tied to power. Socrates never ruled; therefore, he never faced the compromises of governance. Muhammad ruled; therefore, his ethics were tested by necessity. The philosopher could afford idealism; the prophet could not. Still, the historical record invites a question that transcends both: does truth require power, or does power corrupt truth?

Athenian democracy killed Socrates out of fear of free thought; the early Islamic polity defended Muhammad out of fear of disunity. Both societies saw danger in dissent. The difference lies in their aftermaths. Athens regretted its act and built statues to its victim. The Islamic world canonized its leader and turned his biography into sacred narrative. One civilization sanctified doubt; the other sanctified submission. The human need for certainty, however, lives in both.

If Socrates were to meet Muhammad, the dialogue would be tense but illuminating. Socrates would ask questions; Muhammad would quote revelation. Socrates would doubt; Muhammad would affirm. Each would see the other as missing something essential—one lacking faith, the other lacking inquiry. Their encounter would dramatize the central tension of civilization: whether the highest good is obedience or understanding.

History needs both, but reason survives only when it can ask without fear. That is why Socrates’ hemlock remains the symbol of freedom. His calm acceptance of an unjust verdict is a rebuke to all who wield divine or political power to silence criticism. He proved that authority can kill a man but not the idea of thinking freely. In every age, prophets and politicians wield certainty; philosophers keep doubt alive. Between Mecca and Athens, revelation and reason still contend for the soul of humanity.

Sources

¡         PlatoApologyCritoPhaedo (primary accounts of Socrates’ trial and death).

¡         XenophonMemorabilia and Apology of Socrates.

¡         Encyclopaedia Britannica: “Socrates,” “Muhammad.”

¡         Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: “Socrates.”

¡         Ibn IshaqSirat Rasul Allah (as preserved by Ibn Hisham).

¡         Al-TabariTa’rikh al-Rusul wa al-Muluk (History of Prophets and Kings).

¡         Sahih al-Bukhari, Hadiths on Aisha’s age and early community practices.

¡         Uri Rubin, “The Murder of the Jewish Chieftain KaĘżb b. al-Ashraf: A Re-examination,” Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society.

¡         W. Montgomery Watt, Muhammad: Prophet and Statesman.

¡         Fred Donner, Muhammad and the Believers.

¡         Michael Cook, Muhammad.

¡         Karen Armstrong, Muhammad: A Prophet for Our Time.

¡         Patricia Crone and Michael Cook, Hagarism: The Making of the Islamic World.

¡         Huston Smith, The World’s Religions.